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It is now almost three decades since the United States Congress enacted the 
groundbreaking Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), which gives tribal courts 
jurisdiction over custody matters involving many American Indian and Alaskan 
Native children.1 The act also permits Indian tribes to intervene in state custody 
proceedings when Indian children are involved. In enacting the ICWA, Con-
gress responded to evidence that generations of American Indian and Alaskan 
Native children had been removed from their relatives and communities by state 
and church officials convinced that assimilation into the dominant society through 
adoption, foster care, or education in off-reservation boarding schools was in 
the Indian child's best interest (Adams 1995).2 
The use of boarding schools had decreased by the mid-1970s, but not the 
widespread practice of placing Indian children in non-Indian foster and adop-
tive families, often without notice or hearings for the child's family and tribe. 
According to a study conducted by the Association on American Indian Affairs 
(Unger 1977), in the mid-1970s one-quarter to one-third of all Indian children 
were separated from their families, the adoption rate for Indian children was 
twenty times the national rate, and adoptive and foster families for Indian chil-
dren were largely non-Indian. Congressional hearings on the proposed statute 
indicated the deceptive, coercive, and discriminatory practices through which 
Indian children were often separated from their families, as well as the extent to 
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which indigenous patterns of kinship and child-rearing were disregarded in of-
ficials' judgments regarding neglect, abuse, and abandonment.3 
To remedy this situation the ICWA vests jurisdiction of custody matters 
involving Indian children who reside on Indian lands in tribal courts, allows 
tribes the right to intervene in state court custody proceedings when the child 
does not live on Indian land, and provides guidelines for the placement of In-
dian children in foster care and adoptive families. The guidelines give clear 
preference to placement within the child's extended family, followed by place-
ment within families in the child's tribe, and, finally, placement in other Indian 
homes or group homes for Indian children. Placement within a non-Indian fam-
ily, previously the most common placement, is a last resort under the ICWA. 
In the statute Congress declares its intent to "protect the best interest of 
Indian children" and cites as a justification for federal action the failure of state 
courts "to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cul-
tural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families."4 In 
requiring that state courts give tribes notice of custody proceedings concerning 
their children and permit tribes to intervene in or take jurisdiction of these pro-
ceedings, the ICWA both recognizes a tribe's interest in its children and ac-
knowledges that tribal involvement in custody proceedings is in the Indian child's 
best interest. This is a dramatic way of re-conceptualizing who possesses an 
interest in a child as well as a significant reframing of the guiding principle of 
U.S. adoption law: the best interest of the child. 
Enacted on November 8, 1978, the Indian Child Welfare Act anticipated 
developments in the areas of children's rights, adoptees' rights, and cultural 
rights as well as indigenous rights. This article focuses in particular on the chal-
lenges the ICWA poses to hegemonic conceptions of the family and a child's 
best interest. I will also consider how legal and legislative challenges to the 
ICWA have attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to limit the impact of the statute 
by re-invoking hegemonic definitions of biologically-based identity and the 
nuclear family while at the same time challenging the principle of tribal sover-
eignty. While these attempts have, in the main, been unsuccessful, they indicate 
the extent to which the strong sovereignty claims of the ICWA remain, a quarter 
century after its passage, in tension with taken-for-granted views of the indi-
vidual, the family, the state, and Indian identity in the dominant American cul-
ture. 
The "American Indian Renascence" 
and the Indian Child Welfare Act 
Forty years ago anthropologist Nancy Lurie ( 1965) called attention to what 
she termed "an American Indian renascence," referring to a diffuse political 
movement that developed in opposition to the U.S. government's termination 
and relocation policies of the 1950s but expanded to include a variety of initia-
tives for tribal self-determination.5 Although not among the developments con-
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sidered in Lurie's or other contributions to the landmark edited volume, "The 
Indian Today" (published in revised form as The American Indian Today), the 
Indian child welfare movement was part of the same renascence—one Lurie 
viewed as involving "a heightened desire for Indian identity coupled with 
vocalized insistence on recognition of the right of Indian groups to persist as 
distinctive social entities" (Lurie 1965, 35). There is, of course, nothing more 
crucial for cultural persistence than the right to control the upbringing of a 
community's children—a point implicitly made in Shirley Hill Witt's discus-
sion of "nationalistic trends among American Indians" in "The Indian Today." 
Witt emphasized the importance of the extended family, calling it "a major and 
persistent cultural difference between Indians and non-Indians" and "the basic 
building block of tribal organization;" she considered it "directly related to tribal 
vitality" (1965,70-71). This was exactly the rationale of the activists and orga-
nizations that advocated the passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act. 
The ICWA was enacted after more than a decade of intensive work by the 
Association of American Indian Affairs (AAIA) and other Indian rights organi-
zations. The San Juan Pueblo anthropologist Alfonso Ortiz presided over the 
Association on American Indian Affairs when the Indian Child Welfare Act was 
passed, and he considered the legislation one of his most significant accom-
plishments.6 The Act addresses what an AAIA publication called the "destruc-
tion of Native American families" (Unger 1977) primarily through buttressing 
the sovereignty of Indian tribes over their members. As codified in the ICWA, 
tribal sovereignty challenges legal notions of the child's best interest grounded 
in the dominant society's ideologies of possessive individualism, exclusive citi-
zenship, and the primacy of the nuclear family.7 
In keeping with the centrality of tribal sovereignty in the formulation, inter-
pretation, and implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act, I have coined 
the term "extra-tribal adoption" to refer to the placement of an Indian child with 
adoptive parents who are not members of a tribe to which the child belongs (or 
is entitled to belong). This term serves to distinguish the issues involved in the 
adoption of Indian children from those involved in transracial adoption within 
the United States. The ICWA is grounded in the legal status of Indian tribes as 
sovereign nations, which brings the issues involved in extra-tribal adoption closer 
to those encountered in transnational adoptions than in transracial domestic 
adoptions. While cultural identity and cultural survival are at stake in both ex-
tra-tribal and transracial adoption, extra-tribal and transnational adoptions share 
the additional issues of citizenship and self-determination.8 
Any discussion of adoption within the United States must begin with the 
guiding principle of "the best interest of the child."9 According to this principle, 
adoption involves moving a child from "unfit" parents to "fit" ones, and from 
an "unstable" to a "stable" home (Modell 1994,28-29,41-42). There is clearly 
a great deal of room here for ethnocentric judgment and misrepresentation. High 
levels of intervention in Indian families, as in Native Hawaiian families (Modell 
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1998), reflect the imposition of ethnocentric principles of fitness and stability 
upon families organized according to culturally distinct principles. As Steven 
Unger of the Association on American Indian Affairs argued in advocating pas-
sage of the Indian Child Welfare Act: 
The continuing bias of government policy is to coerce Indian 
families to conform to non-Indian child-rearing standards. 
Indian tribes are asking state and federal governments to stop 
"saving" Indian families in this way and, instead, recognize 
and respect the rights and traditional strengths of Indian chil-
dren, families, and tribes (Unger 1997, iii). 
Interpreting extra-tribal adoption as a threat to tribal sovereignty and survival, 
Unger called governmental interference with family life "perhaps the most fla-
grant infringement of the rights of Indian tribes to govern themselves in our 
time and the most tragic aspect of contemporary Indian life" (Unger 1977, iii). 
During legislative hearings, advocates of the Indian Child Welfare Act 
pointed out not only the disproportionate percentage of Indian children sepa-
rated from their natal families, but also that many of these separations were 
carried out without regard to the rights of either birth parents or tribes. Often the 
birth parents did not understand the documents or proceedings, were threatened 
with the loss of welfare benefits, or were neither represented by counsel nor 
advised of their rights. Tribal authorities and community agencies were 
frequently not consulted. Nor were "Indian children's right to live with their 
families" taken into account (Unger 1977, 59). Children were removed for con-
ditions that were not demonstrably harmful to the child, were removed before 
supportive services were extended to families experiencing problems, or were 
removed for a specific purpose and never returned—as in the case of John Wayne 
Cly, whose case is documented in the recent film, "The Return of Navajo Boy" 
(Spitz and Klain 2000). Few children were removed from their families because 
of physical abuse: most often they were removed for "neglect," "abandonment," 
or "social deprivation," which might consist of simply living on a poverty-stricken 
reservation; being under the care of grandparents, siblings, or other members of 
an extended family; or being raised under less restrictive conditions than those 
tolerated in the dominant society (Unger 1977, iii, 4). Likening the "epidemic" 
of extra-tribal adoptions to a "modern Trail of Tears" (a reference to the re-
moval of the "Five Civilized Tribes" from the Southeast in the 1830s), psychia-
trist Joseph Westermeyer noted "a social imperative operating against Indian 
families in our institutions. The result is a de facto ethnocide of values, atti-
tudes, and customs" (54-55). 
Evelyn Blanchard, a Laguna-Yaqui social worker who has been called the 
"mother of the Indian Child Welfare Act" (Johnson 1991,149), criticized "cul-
ture of poverty" theories for ignoring the U.S. government's role in destroying 
Indian family life. She told Congress: 
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Indian families are continually subjected to theories of child 
abuse and neglect that have been developed in the non-Indian 
community. The basis for those positions is that people who 
abuse and neglect their children are people who themselves 
have been abused and neglected. We do not deny that there 
are many Indian parents who live in neglectful situations. 
However, we do contest the interpretation and the application 
of that theory . . . [because] we can clearly demonstrate that 
the circumstances in our lives that have contributed to the 
presence of abuse and neglect in our communities have been 
directly caused by activities, policies, and regulations of the 
federal government. It has consistently sought to destroy the 
Indian family (Myers 1981, 87). 
Acknowledging abusive situations on reservations, Blanchard argued suc-
cessfully for providing Indian tribes the power and resources to address the 
abuses, rather than continuing with destructive policies destined to compound 
them by breaking up families and disrupting patterns of socialization.10 She and 
other proponents of the Indian Child Welfare Act also offered a cogent and far-
reaching critique of a universalizing and ethnocentric interpretation of the prin-
ciple of "best interest of the child." As Navajo legal specialist Leonard B. Jimson 
put it: 
A judge who thinks in term of the comfort and stability of a 
middle-class Anglo home may unconsciously think about this 
when he looks at a Navajo hogan where people do not have 
these same comforts. He may not see the importance of rais-
ing children to speak Navajo or to know their own culture and 
religion, because he assumes that all Navajos want to speak 
and think like Anglos, and this is best for them. In short, the 
way that the caseworker and judge look at family life may be 
so different that Navajo people cannot ever satisfy them, even 
though they also want to do what is in "the best interests" of 
the children (quoted in Unger 1977, 69). 
Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota, who chaired the Subcommittee 
on Indian Affairs and ran the Senate hearings on the ICWA, made a similar 
point, noting that "public and private welfare agencies seem to have operated 
on the premise that most Indian children would really be better off growing up 
non-Indian" (quoted in Unger 1977, 12). This was, indeed, the premise: off-
reservation placements were one of the main ways of implementing govern-
mental policies of "terminating" Indian tribes and assimilating Indian children 
to the Euro-American value of possessive individualism. 
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A dramatic example of this is the American Indian Adoption Project, initi-
ated in 1958 as a joint program of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Child 
Welfare League of America. During the ten years in which this experiment in 
so-called "transracial adoption" was in effect, 395 Indian children were placed 
in non-Indian families, generally in the East and Midwest. On the basis of inter-
views with the adoptive parents, the project was declared a success, in large 
part because Indian children were relatively easy to place because of Euro-
Americans' idealization of the country's original inhabitants. Shockingly, 
researchers did not interview the children's Indian families, nor follow the 
development of the children beyond the first five years (Fanshel 1972; Johnson 
1991,22). 
Evelyn Blanchard went beyond the notion of culturally-determined best 
interest in asserting that "the question of best interest is much broader in Indian 
country than it is elsewhere. Termination hearings sever not only rights of par-
ents but rights of children and rights of tribes" (quoted in Unger 1977,60). She 
is referring here, like Jimson, to the right of parents to follow culturally-specific 
child-rearing practices, but also to the right of children to be affiliated with their 
tribes and the right of tribes to ensure their cultural and demographic survival— 
that is, in Lurie's terms, the right "to persist as distinctive social entities (Lurie 
1965, 35)."n The spirit of the Indian Child Welfare Act is not only to broaden 
the principle of best interest beyond its individualistic basis but also to assert 
that the balancing act that any determination of best interest entails should be 
the responsibility of the tribal community in question. 
Blanchard, Jimson, Abourezk, and others argued that the best interest of 
the Indian child could only be ascertained in tribal terms, not in the individual-
istic terms of the dominant society. While arguments for the passage of the 
Indian Child Welfare Act stressed primarily the destructive consequences of 
extensive extra-tribal adoptions upon children, the devastating impact of these 
adoptions upon families and tribes was also emphasized. Building on the prin-
ciple of tribal self-determination, the ICWA offered a radical challenge to an 
individualistic conception of best interest by recognizing the interest of tribes in 
their children and of children in their tribes. In order to underscore the political 
significance of the re-conceptualization of best interest embodied in the ICWA, 
it is useful to employ models formulated by feminist anthropologists for analyz-
ing the politics of kinship (Franklin and Ragoné 1998; Ginsberg and Rapp 1995; 
Strathern 1992). In these terms the Indian Child Welfare Act establishes: 
• the right of Native American children to have their best 
interest understood relationally, that is, in terms of cul-
turally-constructedpersonhood; 
• the right of Native American parents, children, and fami-
lies to have the dispersed nature of their modes of social 
and cultural reproduction taken into account (also known 
as extended kinship); and 
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• the right of Indian tribes as sovereign nations to control 
their social and cultural reproduction. 
When stated in these ways, the counter-hegemonic nature of the Indian 
Child Welfare Act is evident. Like the concept of tribal sovereignty itself, the 
ICWA establishes collective rights that are in considerable tension with hege-
monic constructions of possessive individualism and the liberal state. In the 
quarter century since its passage, however, the Act has successfully withstood 
several constitutional challenges based on claims that it legislated "disparate 
treatment of parties in state courts based on the parties' race" (Jones 1995, 8). 
The failure of these challenges is largely based on courts finding that the classi-
fication "Indian child" is "not based upon race but on the unique legal status of 
Indians and the political relationship between the quasi-sovereign tribes and the 
federal government" (Myers 1981, 53; Hager 1997, 1-70). In other words, for 
the purposes of the Act an "Indian child" is any child who is potentially a mem-
ber of any federally-recognized Indian tribe—a designation that is defined dif-
ferently from tribe to tribe but has a political rather than a purely biological 
basis. This bears repetition because it is so often misunderstood: just as "In-
dian" is a political category in the United States, "Indian child" is a political, 
not a racial, identity.12 
The Indian Child Welfare Act is far from being fully implemented, espe-
cially in urban areas (largely because of inadequate resources and expertise), 
and it has continued to be challenged in state and federal courts, in Congress, 
and in the court of public opinion. A handbook published by the American Bar 
Association notes that "the custodial fight between biological parents as op-
posed to psychological parents is a common thread woven through many of the 
ICWA cases involving adoption and foster placement" (Jones 1995, viii). Such 
disputes occur in a small minority of cases, generally in voluntary adoptions 
that are completed without involvement of the tribe in question (due to igno-
rance of the law, negligence, misrepresentation, or because the child has not 
been identified as a tribal member or potential member). But these rare cases, 
which pit a tribe's interest in a child against the emotional bond that has devel-
oped between the child and the child's adoptive parents, are most prominent in 
public discourse and in the developing case law.13 
Family and Parenthood Under the 
Indian Child Welfare Act 
The tribal interest recognized by the ICWA results from the status of Indian 
tribes as nations within a nation—the members of which are accorded treaty 
rights that supplement and sometimes limit the individual rights held by all U.S. 
citizens. The United States has alternately advanced and retreated from the lim-
ited political sovereignty accorded to "domestic dependent nations" in the early 
1830s by the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall. Such offi-
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cial policies as land allotment, tribal termination, urban relocation, education in 
boarding schools, and extra-tribal adoption have attempted, with some success, 
to constitute Native Americans as individuals rather than as members of sover-
eign tribes. However, many Native American groups have effectively resisted 
these policies, and in the 1930s, under Franklin Roosevelt's "Indian New Deal," 
and again in the last third of the twentieth century, the political and cultural 
sovereignty of Indian tribes has been reaffirmed by Congress and the Supreme 
Court.14 The ICWA is a particularly significant reaffirmation, one that is ori-
ented as much toward the right of a tribe to determine its own membership and 
be governed by its own laws as toward the best interest of the Indian child. 
While this has been challenged as a violation of the principle of best interest 
(e.g., Kennedy 2003), it is more accurately understood as a non-individualistic 
redefinition of a child's best interest. 
Like the Supreme Court's contemporaneous (and also controversial) deci-
sion in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978)—which granted tribes sovereign 
immunity from law suits challenging tribal membership criteria—the ICWA safe-
guards the right of a tribe to be governed by its own laws and to determine its 
own membership even when these conflict with civil rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution. One way the statute affirms tribal sovereignty is by requiring states 
to give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings 
of any Indian tribe that are applicable to a child custody proceeding. Further, 
the applicability of the statute is contingent on the child in question being an 
"Indian child" as defined by an Indian tribe itself. That is, the ICWA applies to 
a child who is either a member of an Indian tribe, or "a biological child of a 
member of an Indian tribe" who is "eligible for membership."15 Thus, if a tribe's 
public acts or records indicate that a child is a member or a potential member of 
the tribe, the statute requires states to give that determination full faith and 
credit. As we shall see, however, this is one of the areas in which the statute has 
been contested. 
In addition to vesting the determination of tribal membership within Indian 
tribes, the ICWA also recognizes Indian definitions of parenthood and family. 
While these vary over time and across cultures, commonly they entail some 
form of the extended family.16 The report by the House Interior and Insular 
Affairs Committee on the bill that ultimately became the ICWA indicates that 
Congress aimed to enact standards that take into account dispersed parenthood 
and the patterns of care-giving that accompany it in order to prevent a finding of 
neglect or abandonment "where none exists."17 Specifically, the Committee 
Report recognized that Indian notions of family can cover "scores of, perhaps 
more than a hundred, relatives who are counted as close, responsible members 
of the family," and that under this care-giving pattern it is considered normal 
and acceptable to leave a child with any of these family members. Congress 
made clear that in giving the tribes jurisdiction of many child welfare cases, and 
in providing "minimum federal standards and procedural safeguards" in cus-
tody cases involving Indian children that are heard in state courts, it intended to 
What is an Indian Family? 213 
prevent situations where a social worker or judge sought to terminate the par-
ents' rights simply because that official was unfamiliar with or unwilling to 
accept dispersed patterns of care-giving.18 
Congress also recognized Native American conceptions of family and 
parenting by requiring that notice of a foster or adoptive placement be given not 
only to the Indian child's parents and to the child's tribe, but also to any Indian 
custodian of the child. The ICWA further requires that the court both notify an 
Indian custodian of involuntary proceedings and find by clear and convincing 
evidence that serious harm would result if a child were not removed from an 
Indian custodian—just as would be required in order to take a child away from 
a parent. "Indian custodian" is here defined broadly: it includes not only an 
Indian person with legal custody under state law or under tribal law or custom, 
but also any Indian person whom the parent has given "temporary physical care, 
custody, and control" of the child.19 The Committee Report explains the need 
for that provision, noting that given the "extended family concept in the Indian 
community, parents often transfer physical custody of the Indian children to 
[an] extended family member on an informal basis, often for extended periods 
of time." These extended family members "have rights under Indian custom 
which this bill seeks to protect, including the right to protect the parental inter-
ests of the parent."20 In sum, the ICWA assumes the existence and legitimacy of 
extended families, validates the informal care-giving and fostering arrangements 
employed by extended family members, and grants rights to culturally-appro-
priate caregivers that are virtually identical to those of parents. The Indian Child 
Welfare Act is a strong affirmation of culturally-constructed kinship and tribal 
sovereignty alike. 
Cultural Rights, Individual Rights, and the 
Best Interests of the Indian Child 
In addition to expanding conventional notions of the parent and family, the 
ICWA interprets the guiding principle of adoption in the U.S.—"the best inter-
est of the child"—in ways that reflect Native American values and practices. 
First, the statute forbids an involuntary foster care placement of an Indian child, 
or involuntary termination of parental rights, without clear and convincing evi-
dence, including expert testimony, that "continued custody by the parent or In-
dian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the 
child."21 This provision amounts to a presumption against outplacement and 
reflects the determination of Congress that the best interest of an Indian child is 
almost always furthered by retaining the custody of the parent or Indian custo-
dian. Typically, legal presumptions regarding custody only run in favor of the 
child's parent, not an appointee of the parent.22 Thus, by including Indian custo-
dians in that presumption, the statute treats the custodian as a parent. 
Next, the ICWA presumes that it is better for an Indian child to grow up in 
an Indian culture, preferably that of his or her own tribe, than to be reared by 
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non-Indians—even if that means assuming a lower socioeconomic status. The 
statute establishes an order of preference for placement decisions, privileging, 
first, members of the Indian child's extended family, then a foster or adoptive 
home within the Indian child's tribe, then Indian homes, and, finally, Indian 
group homes over non-Indian placements.23 By favoring an Indian placement 
over a non-Indian one, and a tribal placement over a non-tribal one, the statute 
forces courts to acknowledge the importance of cultural affiliation and contact 
for an Indian child when determining that child's best interest. The importance 
Congress accorded to cultural affiliation is most strikingly demonstrated by the 
fact that the statute favors placement within an Indian group home over place-
ment with a non-Indian nuclear family. The relegation to second best of what 
the dominant culture perceives as preferable clearly shows the extent to which 
the statute redefines "best interest." Contrary to some misunderstandings of the 
statute, however, this redefinition does not put the child's interests behind those 
of the tribe. Rather, in emphasizing the child's right to a cultural identity, the 
ICWA recognizes the harm that can be done to a child by denying knowledge of 
and access to that identity. Influenced by the children's rights movement, the 
ICWA anticipated the 1989 United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the 
Child in recognizing a child's right to a cultural identity—understanding that 
identity primarily in tribal terms.24 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the ICWA guarantees Indian children who 
have been adopted out of their tribes the right to information on their heritage. 
This is true even if state law protects the right of the birth parents to anonymity 
and the interest of the adoptive parents in secrecy in order to ensure the finality 
of the adoption. Though it does not entirely open records that the birth parent(s) 
have requested be kept confidential, the ICWA does require the state to share 
with the Department of the Interior (in which the Bureau of Indian Affair is 
housed) identifying information, including the name and tribe of the child, the 
names and addresses of the birth parents, and the identity of any agency that has 
files or information relating to the adoption. Both a tribe and an adopted Indian 
child who has reached age eighteen can request disclosure of whatever informa-
tion is necessary to facilitate the child's enrollment in the tribe. If confidential-
ity has been requested by the birth parent(s), the child's interest in enrolling in 
the tribe and the tribe's interest in the child becoming a member still take prece-
dence. Though the Department of the Interior will not release information whole-
sale when the birth parents have requested confidentiality, if the information 
warrants it the Secretary of the Interior must certify to the tribe that the adopted 
child's parentage and other circumstances of birth entitle the child to enroll-
ment.25 
At the time Congress passed the ICWA, adoptions made through an adop-
tion agency were handled under strict confidentiality "to insure that the natural 
parents can never determine the identity of a child relinquished for adoption; 
and the adopted child, even as an adult, cannot find out the identity of the natu-
ral parents." Further, even where private or independent adoptions were permit-
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ted under state law, most states sealed adoption records "and allow[ed] disclo-
sure only by court order based on some urgent necessity."26 The rationales given 
for these policies usually include the privacy of the birth parents, but also the 
states' interest in encouraging adoption by offering assurance to the adoptive 
parents that the birth parents will not return to reclaim the child or otherwise 
involve themselves in the affairs of the adoptive family.27 
The ICWA, in contrast, takes a view of the Indian child's best interest that 
departs from elements within the conventional notion of parentage that resemble 
the parent having property ownership in the child. While respecting the birth 
parents' desire for confidentiality, the statute lays any privacy concerns of the 
adoptive parents aside in favor of protecting the Indian adoptee's right to dis-
cover and participate in his or her heritage as an Indian. In recognizing the 
importance of cultural rights, community ties, and connections to heritage, as 
well as the claim of an Indian tribe upon its members, Congress departed from 
the hegemonic view of the autonomous individual, which assumes that the best 
interest of a child are independent of his or her ancestry. This was both a depar-
ture from the assimilationist policies of the past and an anticipation of the more 
general recognition of the rights of U.S. adoptees to information about their 
birth parents (Modell 2002). 
The Existing Indian Family Exception and 
Other Attacks on the Indian Child Welfare Act 
In the three decades since the ICWA was enacted, state and federal courts 
have grappled with the practical application of its provisions. In doing so, they 
have not always fully appreciated or respected the values that Congress intended 
to codify through the statute. Most notably, a number of states have curtailed 
tribal rights over members (or prospective members) by applying what has come 
to be known as the Existing Indian Family Exception (or the "Significant Ties 
Exception").28 
The Existing Indian Family Exception is a court-created exception to the 
application of the ICWA maintaining that even if the statute would otherwise 
apply to a child, the courts need not apply it if the birth parents of the child in 
question did not actually constitute an "Indian family"—typically because the 
custodial parent was not an active member of an Indian tribe at the time of the 
adoption.29 Courts utilizing this exception argue that following the procedures 
established by the ICWA in such a case would not serve the purposes of the 
statute: to "promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by 
the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian chil-
dren from their families."30 The courts argue, in other words, that the ICWA's 
aim of preventing the destruction of Indian families would not be furthered if 
the statute was applied in a case in which the family from which the child is 
taken is not what the court recognizes as an "Indian family." 
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In treating Congress's intent as simply the protection of "Indian families," 
these courts have disregarded not only the statute's goal of protecting the child's 
interest in tribal affiliation but also the goal of promoting the "stability and 
security of Indian tribes." The courts are, in effect, reading out of the statute the 
ICWA's conception of extended parenthood—one that includes the tribe as a 
close equivalent of a parent. In fact, courts that have rejected the Existing In-
dian Family Exception have criticized it on precisely these grounds. For in-
stance, the Alaska Supreme Court refused to interpret the ICWA as permitting 
an Indian family exception, arguing that doing so "would undercut the interests 
of Indian tribes and Indian children that Congress sought to protect." The Alaska 
court specifically recognized that in enacting the ICWA "Congress did not seek 
simply to protect the interest of individual Indian parents. Rather, Congress 
sought to also protect the interest of Indian tribes and communities, and the 
interests of the Indian children themselves."31 
Another problem with the Existing Indian Family Exception is revealed in 
a prominent 1996 case, In re Bridget R.32 In this case the California appellate 
court held that if the application of the ICWA was based "solely on [the child's] 
biological heritage" as an Indian, then the statute would contravene the due 
process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by insti-
tutionalizing a race-based classification (507). Following this reasoning, the 
court applied the Existing Indian Family Exception to save the statute from 
unconstitutionality. This case merits close scrutiny because of the constitutional 
issues involved and the heated public debates it has engendered. 
The case arose soon after Richard Adams and Cindy Ruiz gave up their 
twin daughters for adoption. Adams was the son of a Porno Indian, although at 
the time of the adoption he was not an enrolled member. Three months after the 
adoption, Adams and Ruiz attempted to withdraw their consent to the adoption 
on the grounds that the adoption had not followed the ICWA's procedures and 
placement preferences. The Porno tribe, at the request of Adams's mother, inter-
vened in the case. The California courts were asked to determine whether the 
adoption was valid, given that Adams (on the advice of his attorney) had not 
revealed his Porno background. 
The trial court held that the ICWA did, indeed, apply to the case, and that 
the statute's provisions required that the twins be reunited with their birth par-
ents. On appeal, however, the California appellate court reversed the trial court's 
decision, ultimately remanding the case for further consideration by the trial 
judge. In rejecting the trial court's position, the appellate court held that if the 
ICWA infringed on the twins' constitutionally protected interest in the relation-
ships they had developed with their adoptive family without "serv[ing] a com-
pelling governmental purpose," the Fourteenth Amendment's due process re-
quirements would invalidate the statute. Similarly, the appellate court argued 
that the twins' right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibited a race-based classification (that is, one based on "Indian blood") that 
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was not "narrowly tailored" to further a "compelling" governmental interest. 
Unless the ICWA's application was limited to situations in which the child's 
family had sufficient social, cultural, or political affiliation with an Indian tribe, 
ruled the court, the classification "Indian child" was race-based; furthermore, 
applying the ICWA under these circumstances would not further Congress's 
purpose of preserving Indian culture and its unique values. Under this reason-
ing, the statute would interfere, without justification, with the girls' interest in 
the family relationships they had developed with their adoptive family, thus 
violating their constitutional rights (526-27). 
Because the trial court had not considered whether the twins' birth family 
was an "Indian family," the appellate court sent the case back for consideration 
of that issue. In doing so, the appellate court directed the lower court to con-
sider whether the birth parents had sufficient social, cultural, and political ties 
or relations with the tribe for the court to consider them an "Indian family." 
Moreover, the appellate court told the trial court to "focus upon the biological 
parents ' . . . relationship with the Tribe," and to consider the extended family's 
relationship with the Porno tribe only as it "bears on the issue of the biological 
parents' relationship" (531, emphasis in original). Such a mandate directly con-
tradicts the notions of extended family and tribal determination of membership 
that the ICWA was seeking to validate and protect. 
The appellate court decision in Bridget R. clearly demonstrates the 
problems that arise when a court attempts to apply the Existing Indian Family 
Exception. Specifically, the exception allows state courts to determine who is 
Indian enough to receive protection under the ICWA by making the determina-
tion of which families are Indian families a factual question for the court to 
resolve.33 Since Congress was attempting to limit the state court's ability to 
make ethnocentric value judgments about Indian families by enacting the ICWA, 
bringing state courts back into such a position through the Existing Indian Fam-
ily Exemption directly violates Congressional intent. Indeed, applications of 
the Existing Indian Family Exception result in court decisions and rationales 
that run contrary to the intent of the ICWA. 
For example, in Bridget R. the court explicitly rejected the Porno tribe's 
and the birth parents' argument that the extended family's ties to the tribe should 
be given consideration if the ICWA's valuing of the tribal kinship system were 
to be respected. Instead, the court said that the nuclear family was the proper 
unit for determining whether an Indian family existed, explaining—incredibly— 
that when the ICWA referred to an "Indian family," it must have meant the 
nuclear family, which is "the fundamental social unit in civilized society" (531). 
Comments such as this show that the court did not simply misunderstand the 
Indian family structures that Congress intended the ICWA to recognize, but 
rejected and impugned them, in effect labeling them "uncivilized." It was pre-
cisely to avoid decisions based on such prejudicial attitudes that Congress en-
acted the statute. 
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Moreover, that holding was completely unnecessary to the appellate court's 
stated purpose of saving the statute from unconstitutionality. The designation 
"Indian child" is not primarily a biological classification but rather a political 
classification that entails membership, or the possibility of membership, in a 
sovereign nation entitled, under U.S. law, to determine its own membership. It 
is no more a biological classification than is U.S. citizenship, and it does not 
necessarily entail a particular degree of participation in tribal customs and af-
fairs, but rather the possibility of such participation. Similarly, under ICWA the 
classification "Indian family" is neither a race-based classification nor one that 
is dependent upon meeting a set of court-imposed cultural criteria. An "Indian 
family" under ICWA is a family in which the potential for tribal membership 
exists, according to the membership requirements of the tribe in question. It is 
also a classification that explicitly recognizes the significance of extended fami-
lies in socializing and caring for Indian children. In rejecting the relevance of 
the extended family's connections to the tribe and in requiring the court to focus 
on the birth parent's ties to the tribe at the time of the adoption—without recog-
nizing that tribal membership and participation may be initiated at any stage in 
the life cycle, and may skip generations—the appellate court in effect denied 
the political status of Indian tribes as sovereign nations with the right to control 
their own social and cultural reproduction. It appears, indeed, that the appellate 
court came close to ruling that Indian tribes may themselves be unconstitutional 
(530-31).34 
Interpretations of the Indian Child's 
Best Interest in the Public Sphere 
The news coverage surrounding the Bridget R. case and subsequent com-
mentary, like the decision itself, indicates the extent to which the perspective of 
the ICWA challenges hegemonic notions of family and personhood. For ex-
ample, a Los Angeles Times article (Rainey 1996), published between the trial 
and appellate courts' decisions, framed the debate as one "over adoption, In-
dian sovereignty, and children's rights." In opposing tribal sovereignty to 
children's rights, the author, James Rainey, misconstrues the statute and its con-
ception of a child's best interest. As discussed earlier, the provisions of the 
ICWA make it clear that Congress understood a child's best interests as includ-
ing the right to remain in his or her extended family, to maintain an affiliation 
with his or her tribe, and to have knowledge of his or her heritage. Only when 
one fails to acknowledge such interests will the tribe's interest in an Indian child 
appear inconsistent with the child's rights. Rainey's framing of the case demon-
strates that he is operating from the hegemonic perspective in which the rights 
of Indian children are understood as those of autonomous individuals who have 
little need for affiliation with the group with whom they share a cultural heri-
tage. In other words, he is construing children's rights as excluding what has 
come to be known as a child's right to his or her culture. 
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Quotes from others close to the case indicate the distance between hege-
monic and tribally-centered perspectives. For instance, the adoptive mother is 
quoted as asking "What about what is in the best interests of the kids? Who is 
paying attention to that?" It is understandable that, from her perspective, the 
best interest of the twins centers around the attachment they have formed to 
their adoptive parents, rather than their long-term interest in attachment to the 
Porno tribe. In contrast, however, a statement by the twins' Porno aunt high-
lights the importance of "a sense of belonging" or "roots." She argues that such 
grounding is "important for a person's identity and self-esteem. It's who they 
are." The two sides in this adoption dispute appear to be interested in the same 
thing—the wellbeing of the children- but they conceive of that goal and how 
best to achieve it quite differently. While the way each side approaches the issue 
is indicative of their opposing positions in the litigation, it is also indicative of 
competing cultural perspectives on family and personhood—one grounded in 
the individualism of the dominant society, the other in the more sociocentric 
views and practices of Native American cultures. Although the latter is embod-
ied in the ICWA, it remains foreign to many members of the dominant society 
engaged in adoption and child welfare cases involving Indian children—even, 
scholars have found, to some professionals involved in custody cases involving 
Indian children (Brown and Rieger 2001). 
Rainey's description of the identity of the birth parents also demonstrates 
competing views of who warrants the ICWA's protection. Rainey notes that ac-
cording to the adoptive parents, Jim and Colette Rost, the birth father "is about 
one-sixteenth Porno, which would make his daughters one-thirty-second." Nu-
merous other articles on the case also refer to Richard Adams's percentage of 
"Indian blood."35 In contrast, Rainey reports that members of the Porno tribe 
refuse "to discuss percentages, saying that they are a concern of an alien cul-
ture." In other words, Porno spokespersons are rejecting the biologically-based 
definition of Indian identity characteristic of the dominant society, utilizing in-
stead a definition based on a concept of social belonging (Strong and Van Winkle 
1996).36 
Media coverage of the Bridget R. case clearly reveals two opposing per-
spectives. On the one hand, the adoptive family and the media are concerned 
with how Indian (or not) the girls and their birth parents are, and define their 
Indian identity in relation to the "blood quanta" and life style of the birth par-
ents. Tribal members, on the other hand, focus on the relationship of the girls to 
an extended set of relatives who belong to the tribe. This is also the perspective 
of the ICWA, which defines an "Indian child" as one who is "the biological 
child of a member of an Indian tribe," but ultimately leaves the determination of 
tribal identity up to the tribe by requiring that the child be a tribal member or 
"eligible for membership." The statute indicates no concern with a child's blood 
quantum—a biological measure of Indianness imbued with racist notions of 
purity and contamination—but rather with cultural definitions of relatedness 
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and belonging. That the social and political definition of Indian identity codi-
fied in the ICWA is difficult for many members of the dominant society to un-
derstand or accept reflects the extent to which the Indian Child Welfare Act— 
like tribal sovereignty itself—embodies powerful counter-hegemonic principles. 
Attempts to Amend the Indian Child Welfare Act 
The Adams and Rost families settled their dispute when the Bridget R. case 
was on remand to the trial court, agreeing that the girls would live with their 
adoptive family and allowing the Adams family visitation rights and other con-
tacts (Rainey 1997). The settlement left conflicting court interpretations intact— 
in particular those involving the Existing Indian Family Exemption—and the 
conflicts have not been resolved in Congress, which neither codified the ex-
emption, nor specifically rejected it when amendments were proposed to do so 
between 1996 and 2003.37 Debates on these and subsequent amendments, both 
within Congress and in the media, further illustrate the competing notions of 
family and best interest involved in the interpretation and implementation of the 
statute. 
An initial bill, filed by Representatives Deborah Pryce of Ohio and Todd 
Tiahrt of Kansas in 1996, sought to amend the ICWA by codifying the Existing 
Indian Family Exception. The amended statue would have only applied to cases 
in which one of the child's parents was of Indian descent, a member of an Indian 
tribe, and "maintained] significant social, cultural, or political affiliation" with 
that tribe.38 The bill was vigorously opposed by Indian groups and died in the 
Senate. 
During the next session, in 1997, Representative Pryce's bill was reintro-
duced, but the bill that got the most support and was voted out of committee was 
one that worked against attempts to codify the Existing Indian Family Exemp-
tion. House Resolution 1082, introduced by Representatives Don Miller of Cali-
fornia and Don Young of Alaska, sought to clarify the procedures for notifying 
tribes, to impose more finality on adoptions of Indian children, and to crimi-
nally penalize attorneys and officials who tried to circumvent the requirements 
of the ICWA by hiding a child's heritage.39 Representative Miller explained his 
bill as "intended to strengthen the act," and "to protect the lives and future of 
Indian children... first by ensuring that they will have as equal a chance as any 
other children at having a loving family and home and second, by protecting 
their interest in their own culture and heritage."40 He also noted that the bill 
would "protect the fundamental rights of tribal sovereignty."41 
Representative Pryce opposed the bill in favor of her own approach, 
arguing, as the California appellate court had, that without an Existing Indian 
Family Exception "the ICWA flies in the face" of the constitutional principles 
protecting "the rights of individuals against classifications based on race" and 
"the rights of parents to control their children's upbringing." She argued that 
"fundamental liberty and privacy issues" were at stake, suggesting that the pro-
What is an Indian Family? 221 
visions of the ICWA might deprive a non-Indian woman of her freedom to place 
her child for adoption or to select particular adoptive parents "solely because 
her child has Indian blood."42 
There could be no clearer statement of the challenge posed by the ICWA to 
possessive individualism, and vice versa. Reducing the tribe's interest in the 
hypothetical child to a matter of "Indian blood," the example appears to 
constrain a mother's right to decide what is best for her child on the basis of a 
race-based classification. As we have seen, however, the woman's decision is 
actually constrained by the child's interest in tribal membership and affiliation, 
as well as by the tribe's interest in the welfare of its members and potential 
members. Even if the rights of the tribe are set aside, Representative Pryce's 
example demonstrates a remarkable disregard for the best interests of the child, 
broadly construed, in favor of parental rights. 
Furthermore, on a practical level such a situation is only likely to arise 
when the child's father or another paternal relative has requested that the tribe 
get involved. If the father is acknowledging paternity, the mother's decision to 
place the child for adoption could not be made without terminating his paternal 
rights. The same constitutional principles Representative Pryce cites forbid such 
a termination without the father's consent or his involuntary forfeiture of his 
rights. Representative Pryce presumably would not dispute the father's right to 
"interfere" in the mother's decision regarding the adoption of his child. There 
would then seem to be only two possible objections: either Representative Pryce 
objects to the father pursuing his interests through his tribe, or she objects to the 
ICWA's provisions that allow the tribe to protect its interest in children who are 
its members or potential members. In either case, her argument is an outright 
rejection of the ICWA's determination that the tribe should have an interest in 
the child that is on par with that of a parent. Moreover, the tribe's intervention 
differs little from how any sovereign might act when one of its citizens is brought 
before a foreign tribunal. Therefore, Representative Pryce's argument funda-
mentally denies the tribal sovereignty that the ICWA upholds and reinforces. 
Media accounts of the competing bills also illustrate a conflict in conven-
tional conceptions of best interest and those codified in the ICWA. During the 
period the Pryce-Tiahrt bill was pending before Congress, Jennifer Dokes (1996), 
a columnist for The Arizona Republic, argued against the bill, cautioning that 
while extra-tribal adoptions offer the possibility that children will "thrive in 
loving homes," they also involve the risk of the children "losing something of 
themselves, of becoming something they are not, of becoming lost, disconnected 
from their cultural heritage." In response, a letter to the editor chastised the 
columnist for worrying that the legislation would weaken tribal ties when the 
ICWA was blocking adoptions of children with "only a fraction of Indian blood 
and whose families have no cultural ties in their Indian heritage." The authors 
of the letter, Beth and Bob Joice (1996), complained that the ICWA and courts 
"treat children like chattel," and that the Pryce-Tiahrt bill would make it more 
likely that the children "grow up in a loving family that can provide for them." 
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The letter, once again, reduces the relationship of the Indian child to his or 
her tribe to one of blood or ethnicity, failing to acknowledge the political di-
mension of the relationship. For the Joices (1996) and those of like mind, "the 
ethnicity of the child and parent should not be an issue" in adoptions. All that 
should be taken into account is the "possibility of forming a loving family." The 
letter goes beyond this position, however, in arguing that following the provi-
sions of the ICWA is to treat Indian children as "chattel," i.e., as property. Pre-
sumably, this serious charge relates to the tribe's right to intervene and claim an 
interest in its members or potential members. In U.S. law, however, all relations 
between parents and their children have elements of property interests—from 
the exclusivity of parental rights, to invocations of "liberty and privacy issues," 
to discussions of "possession" or "custody." In claiming that the ICWA leads to 
treating children like chattel, the Joices appear not to be taking exception to 
parental rights per se, but rather to the statute's view of who may properly exer-
cise parental rights over a child—that is, whether parental rights are restricted 
to the nuclear family and adoptive parents or whether they may be vested in the 
extended family and tribe. Ultimately, it is not the existence of property rights 
in children that is in dispute, but their breadth. 
There have been two further attempts to amend the ICWA, although neither 
passed out of committee. In 2002 Representative Young introduced another 
resolution in the House that addressed continuing problems with the interpreta-
tion and implementation of the ICWA, including a special set of problems re-
lated to Alaska Natives and non-federally recognized tribes.43 The next year 
Representative Young and several co-sponsors introduced a resolution that of-
fered an expanded set of proposals. Both of these bills sought to strengthen the 
ICWA through nullifying the Existing Indian Family Exception, among other 
provisions.44 
Since 2003 there have been no further attempts to amend the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, so the Existing Indian Family Exception has been neither defini-
tively codified nor nullified. However, at the request of House Majority Leader 
Tom DeLay, the Government Accountability Office (2005) conducted a study 
of several aspects of the implementation of the Act. The report focuses on three 
aspects, including, first, the various factors that influence placement decisions 
for children subject to ICWA (such as how long it takes to determine if a child is 
subject to ICWA, the availability of Indian foster homes or adoptive parents, 
and the level of state and local cooperation with tribes). The study found dispar-
ate state-by-state conditions in all these factors, depending on such things as the 
relative size of the Indian population, the number of federally recognized In-
dian tribes in a state, and the kinds of cooperative relationships necessary for 
implementing the Act (e.g., between Indian tribes and local, state, and federal 
agencies). 
Second, the study looked at whether placements for children subject to 
ICWA are delayed in comparison to other placements. Using data from four 
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states with large Indian populations that maintained records identifying chil-
dren subject to ICWA, the study found that the length of stay of Indian children 
in foster homes was not significantly different from that of children not subject 
to the ICWA, although differences existed among the four states (Oklahoma, 
Washington, Oregon, and South Dakota). 
Finally, the report examined federal oversight of states' implementation of 
the ICWA. The ICWA has no provision for direct oversight of the implementa-
tion of the law by states (this, in fact, was one of the provisions of Representa-
tive Young's 2003 resolution). The Administration for Children and Families of 
the Department of Health and Human Services does, however, review and col-
lect limited information about the ICWA in its annual Child and Family Ser-
vices Reviews. The Government Accountability Office recommended that the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Administration for Children 
and Families to review the available ICWA implementation information and 
"require states to discuss in their annual progress and services reports any sig-
nificant ICWA issues not addressed in their program improvement plans" (GAO 
2005, 5). The Secretary of Health and Human Services, however, disagreed 
with the GAO's conclusions and recommendations, pointing out that the de-
partment had neither the authority, the resources, nor the expertise to address 
the concerns raised in the Report and suggesting that perhaps the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs was the appropriate agency to provide oversight on the imple-
mentation of the ICWA. The BIA, however, said that it "had no comments on 
the report as it has no oversight authority for states' implementation of ICWA" 
(GAO 2005, 59). 
The impasse that appears to have been reached regarding both oversight 
responsibility and the Existing Indian Family Exception is instructive. We have 
seen, with respect to the latter, that the Existing Indian Family Exception 
appeals to those who reject the ICWA's challenge to hegemonic notions of 
possessive individualism and the nuclear family. The impasse on oversight re-
sponsibility, on the other hand, would seem to support those who criticize the 
interpretation of tribal sovereignty in the neoliberal age as one that tends to-
ward the "offloading of obligations for the welfare of Indian people from the 
federal or state governments" (Biolsi 2004:244). While ICWA has had a salu-
tary effect on tribal families, communities, and governments in many respects, 
the inadequate provision for monitoring its implementation by states indicates 
that it is likely that in some cases (and without monitoring it is impossible to say 
how many) the welfare of Indian children and families has fallen between the 
cracks of various tribal, state, and federal bodies. It is also undoubtedly the 
case, as Randall Kennedy (2003) charges, that Indian children continue to be 
harmed through living in poverty and suffering other forms of deprivation not 
addressed by the ICWA. Rather than constitute an argument against the ICWA, 
this should, instead, be a rationale for directing additional resources to its imple-
mentation and to providing social services for Indian children and families. 
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Conclusion 
When Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act nearly three decades 
ago, it maintained that state courts had often failed to recognize the "essential 
tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing 
in Indian communities and families."45 Given the radical challenge that the ICWA 
poses to hegemonic conceptions of individual rights and the primacy of the 
nuclear family, it is not surprising that some state courts have continued to fol-
low the standards of the dominant society rather than tribal standards in inter-
preting the best interest of the Indian child. Moreover, given the ICWA's strong 
recognition of tribal sovereignty—always contested in the dominant society, 
and increasingly so at the turn of the century—it is also not surprising that some 
state courts and representatives to Congress have attempted to reinstate state 
and federal jurisdiction over crucial matters such as the determination of what 
constitutes an "Indian family." The unique political status of Indian tribes is 
poorly understood and unevenly accepted in the dominant society, lending plau-
sibility—if not success—to attempts to consider the categories "Indian child" 
and "Indian family" as race-based classifications and the ICWA a "race match-
ing" regime (Kennedy 2003, 518). 
More significant than the inevitable court and legislative challenges to the 
ICWA is its success in returning jurisdiction over Indian children living on tribal 
lands to their tribes. Opposition to the ICWA has focused on the small number 
of difficult cases in which adoption is contested, often because a child's Indian 
ancestry was not revealed at the time of the adoption. A great number of uncon-
tested adoptions have been conducted under the ICWA, dramatically reversing 
a centuries-old pattern of attempting to assimilate Indian children to the values 
and institutions of the dominant culture by removing them from their families. 
Tribal responsibility for adoption and child welfare has required the expansion 
of tribal courts and welfare systems, the training of Native American profes-
sionals, and the development of working relationships between state and tribal 
officials. Scholarly and media attention to contested cases (and even to fictional 
ones) should not obscure the importance of the more routine engagement of 
Indian courts, welfare agencies, and communities in the practice of protecting 
tribal sovereignty, Indian families, and the best interest of Indian children.46 
The Indian Child Welfare Act, no less than the better known gaming and repa-
triation acts of recent years (Johnson 1999), is a significant achievement of the 
"American Indian renascence" of the last third of the twentieth century. 
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adoptees access to their adoption records upon request (In re Adoption of Female Infant, 105 
Daily Wash. Law Rep. 245 [Sup. Ct. of D.C. 1997], citing "Project, Government Information and 
the Rights of Citizens," 73 Michigan Law Review 1269-70 [1975]). 
27. See/« re Adoption of Female Infant: 105; Mnookin 1978, 621; Carp 1998, 104-113. 
28. See also Metteer 1997 and Myers, Thorington, and Myers 1998. 
29. See In re the Matter of the Adoption of Baby Boy L., 692 R2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982); In 
re the Matter ofS.C. andJ.C, 833 R2d 1249, 1254-55 (Okl. 1992); In re the Adoption ofT.R.M., 
525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988); In the Matter of the Adoption of Infant Boy Crews, 825 P.2d 305, 
310 (Wash. 1992). 
30. 25 U.S.C. §1902. 
31. In re the Matter of the Adoption ofT.N.F, 783 P.2d 973, 977 (Alaska 1989). 
32. In re Bridget R. 
33. For astute analyses of the pitfall of allowing a court to determine whether an individual, 
family, or community is "Indian enough," see Campisi (1991) and Clifford (1988). 
34. See Kennedy (2003) for an opposing view of the Existing Indian Family Exception. 
Kennedy supports codifying this exception to "minimize racialist opportunism" through which 
tribes "capture children" (518). This rhetoric seems to play on the longstanding typification of 
the Indian captor in Anglo-American captivity narratives (Strong 1999, 2001, 2002). 
35. See, for example, "Appeals Court" 1996; Edwards 1995; Narciso 1996; Rainey 1997. 
36. See Sarris (1993) for an interpretation of Porno identity that focuses on shared narratives 
and social networks. 
37. See S.1976, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Congressional Record S18532, S18533 (daily 
ed. Dec. 19, 1987). 
38. H.R. 3275 104th Congress, 4/18/96. 
39. H.R. 1082 105th Congress, 1st Session, 3/13/97. 
40. Congressional Record-Extension 105th Congress, 1st Session (3/13/97); 143 
Congressional Record E. 462. 
41. 143 Congressional Record E462; 105 H.R. 1082, sec. 6. 
42. Federal News Service, "Prepared Testimony of Rep. Deborah Pryce Before the Senate 
Indian Affairs Committee and House Resources Committee," 6/18/97. 
43. H. R. 4733, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002). For the interpretation and implementation 
of ICWA in Alaska, see Brown 2004, 261-265; Brown and Morrow 2001. 
44. H. R. 2750 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003). The other provisions include: extending the 
ICWA to cover children of state-recognized Indian tribes and children who live on a reservation 
and are a child or grandchild of a member even if they are not eligible for membership; giving 
parents the right to withdraw consent to an adoption up to six months after relinquishment of the 
child; clarifying that the ICWA applies to all children involved in child custody proceedings; 
clarifying the rights of Indian tribes to intervene in child custody proceedings and clarifying 
some issues of tribal governance in Alaska, including the rights of tribes without reservations; 
clarifying the rights of tribal courts and tribal governments vis-à-vis state courts and governments; 
defining the minimum active efforts that must be undertaken to prevent the breakup of an Indian 
child's family; defining under what circumstances state ICWA violations may be reviewed by 
federal courts and establishing a federal review system of state ICWA compliance; requiring 
detailed notice to Indian tribes, parents, and extended family members in voluntary and involuntary 
adoption proceedings; requiring attorneys and agencies to provide detailed information to Indian 
parents of their rights under the ICWA; making it easier for Indian adoptees to obtain access to 
their birth records; and providing criminal sanctions for lying about Indian ancestry with regard 
to the ICWA (National Indian Child Welfare Association 2004). 
45. 25 U.S.C. 1901(e) (1978). 
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46. Barbara Kingsolver's novel Pigs in Heaven (1993) offers an insightful exploration and 
a fictional resolution of opposing perspectives on ICWA; see Metteer 1996 and Strong 2001. 
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